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Abstract. This paper surveys the main issues in Suárez’s theory of visual perception, 
which in its complexity and systematical ordering has not been explored yet. These 
questions, exposed in the first five questions of the seventh disputation De sensibus ex-
terioribus in particulari of Suárez’s Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis 
and in the first two sections of the fifth disputation De potentiis cognoscitivis in communi, 
are the following: 1) the nature of light; 2) the nature of colour; 3) the formal (adequate) 
object of vision; 4) the necessity and the nature of the visual species; 5) the critique of 
the theory of extramission; and 6) the organ of visual power. The main emphasis is laid 
on the presentation of the systematical dimension of Suárez’s visual theory. 
Keywords: light; colour; visual species; extramission; Aristotle. 
Introduction
Like any theory of visual perception, Suárez’s doctrine of seeing consists of 
a large body of doctrines ramified into many philosophical and scientific disci-
plines such as optics, epistemology, psychology, ontology, physics, physiology, 
anatomy and, to a small extent, geometry as well.1 In its psycho-ontologi-
1 This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the pro-
ject GA ČR 14-37038G: “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge 
in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”.
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co-physical core, Suárez’s visual theory is found in the first five quaestiones 
of the seventh disputation of his Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros 
Aristotelis “De anima” (further: DA VII),2 in which the Jesuit ex professo deals 
with the five external senses (De sensibus exterioribus in particulari). Besides 
DA VII, topics bearing on the subject of visual theory are presented in DA V 
and DA VI. The explicit subjects of DA V–VI3 – discussing cognition and sense 
perception from a general point of view – are the following issues related to 
the theory of external senses: necessity and nature of the impressed sensible 
species (species sensibilis impressa), nature and (co)principles of the cognitive 
act, nature of the terminus of cognitive act (the so-called species expressa), 
sensory (inchoative) judgment, typology of sensibles, production of sensible 
species (the problem of sensus agens), (self)consciousness of external senses, 
organic “root” of sensation and the question of animal spirits (spiritus ani-
males), veridicality of the external senses.4 Setting aside the issues related to 
general theory of cognition as such, which can be regarded as the “preambula” 
of the visual theory proper – only the consideration of the question of the 
integral principles (causes) of the perceptual act would make our treatment 
of visual perception complete, indeed5 –, the core issues expounded in DA 
VII, 1–5 are as follows: the nature of light and color; their bearing on the 
issue of adequate object of vision; the query whether seeing proceeds by 
means of the extramission of visual rays from the eyes to the sensibles, or via 
the intromission of the representatives of the sensibles; the organ of visual 
perception. All these topics can be considered to be part of the large corpus 
of issues constitutive of Suárez’s visual theory. 
In order to present Suárez’s theory of vision, namely the external con-
ditions and the internal constituents of perceptual organs as integrally as 
possible, I will focus just on the core of his teaching in the first five questions 
2 I will quote from the critical edition: Suárez 1981, vol. 2, ed. Castellote.
3 While DA V is called “De potentiis cognoscitivis in communi” (282–451), DA VI is titled 
“De sensibus in communi” (452–545). 
4 For the analysis of the various aspects of the general theory of external senses see South 
2001. 
5 I have already treated the issue of Suárez’s “cognitive activism” elsewhere. See Heider, 
2015; 2016 a, 38–66, esp. 47–52; cf. also 2017 (forthcoming).
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of DA VII and on the relevant aspects of his theory of species visuales from 
DA V, 2. These two segments are closely related. My primary goal is to 
reconstruct Suárez’s highly systematic theory of vision from bottom to top, 
i.e., from the theory of visual objects, i.e., light and color, via the doctrine of 
species visibilis in medio and in the organ, up to the doctrine of the direction 
of vision and the visual organ. This exposition of the nodal points of the 
Jesuit’s complex visual theory is a desirable enterprise since as such it has 
not been elaborated yet.6 
1. “Naturalistic” and Qualitative Concept of Light
Much like Aristotle in the seventh chapter of the second book of his De 
anima,7 Suárez starts his enquiry into seeing with an analysis of light. When 
he asks “what the nature of light (lumen) is” he has in mind the light in 
a transparent medium (the air). By this outline he sets aside light conceived 
as lux, light inhering in a luminous source such as fire. In his preliminary 
statement, Suárez declares that light is something real. Light cannot be 
eliminated as a mere manifestation of colour (coloris manifestatio). We often 
see light not seeing any colour when we see, e.g., the heavens. Having estab-
lished that lumen is a real item and having answered the question “An sit?” 
Suárez comes to the question “Quid sit lumen?”. The Jesuit rejects three 
rival theories. Following Aristotle he first of all turns down the thesis that 
light is a body (corpus). If lumen were a body, then two bodies (light and the 
illuminated object) would coexist in the same place. This is an impossible 
state of affairs at least in the natural order. Moreover, if the effluence of 
lumen were similar to the egression of corpuscles, light would have to traverse 
space in time. In the perception of distant objects this “wandering” would 
become noticeable by the human eye, however. As Aristotle explains in On 
Sense and Sensible Objects,8 this temporal delay, caused by local motion of 
6 For the expositions of its partial aspects see Knuuttila 2015, 205–6 and Castellote 1962, 
145–150. 
7 Aristotle, On the Soul, 2000, book 2, ch. 7, 418b3ff, 105.
8 Aristotle, On Sense and Sensible Objects, 2000, ch. 6, 446b26–447a12, 269.
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light, cannot be attributed to light since all the parts of the medium lying 
between the luminous body and the organ of the percipient are affected in 
an instant (DA VII, 1, vol. 2, 552–4).
Having dismissed the corpuscularian account Suárez comes to disclaim 
the view that light is the substantial form of the sun. As the Jesuit avers in 
DA IX, 4, no substantial form can be sensed per se. Substantial form is not 
sensible per se but only sensible per accidens (DA VII, 2, vol. 2, 554). Rejecting 
the first two competing theories, Suárez arrives at the opening conclusion: 
“Light is an accidental act pertaining to the category of quality” [“Lumen 
est actus accidentalis ad praedicamentum qualitatis pertinens.”] (DA VII, 
1, 3, vol. 2, 554). As an accident light must inhere in its subject, namely in 
a translucent medium, which is penetrable by light throughout. 
What kind of quality is light? On one of the influential sentiments (ac-
tually the third one denied by Suárez) lumen is the intentional species of lux. 
Accordingly, light cannot be a physical quality since its properties are identical 
with those of the intentional species. Like the sensible species, by virtue of 
which we perceive sensibles while not seeing the species themselves, we 
perceive the sun through sunlight without seeing light itself. Light thus does 
not constitute the per se visibile but only that, by which (quo) we apprehend 
the sensible object and not the object (quod) of our vision. Moreover, light 
has to be of spiritual nature since colours, transferred from the sensibles to 
sight, do not have natural (physical) being but only intentional or spiritual 
being. They do not interfere with each other. The upshot of this reasoning 
seems to be as follows: Rather than a physical entity light is a more subtle 
entity, which is nobler than the physical sensible quality, having spiritual 
and immaterial being. Suárez is not impressed by this argument, which draws 
from the metaphysics of light present in the Neoplatonist tradition. He makes 
clear that all the analogies between the intentional species and light are only 
virtual since lumen is a quality having natural and true being. [“Lumen est 
qualitas habens proprium esse naturale et reale.”] (DA VII, 1, 8, vol. 2, 558). 
Contrary to the intentional species, light is the object of seeing. Unlike the 
intentional species, light denominates its subject. We say that the sensible 
object, say Peter, is illuminated while we do not say that Peter who sees the 
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green colour turns green. Moreover, light cannot be a spiritual entity since 
it has material effects such as heating and drying (DA VII, 1, 6, vol. 2, 558). 
Suárez’s “naturalistic” concept of lumen is underlined by the third 
conclusion which has three parts: 1) The light of air is a quality which can 
be seen as an object (terminus); 2) the light is not visible per se but through 
its species; 3) the sensible species is not the species by which we see the sun. 
[“Lumen aeris est qualitas visibilis, quae videtur tamquam obiectum visus; 
et non videtur per se, sed per species sui; neque etiam est species per quam 
sol videatur.”] (DA VII, 1, 9, vol. 2, 560). First, it is a part of our experience 
that we perceive light in a different “quality” when we see it brighter at noon 
and less bright at twilight. Second, after the vision of light the species of 
light remains in the phantasy. So later on we are able to know light in the 
abstractive way, i.e., in its absence. This shows that the visual species of 
light is impinged on sight. Third, the species of light is not directed to the 
cognition of the sun since it is not its formal likeness. Not differently from 
heat, light is a communication of the luminary source. If light were the 
species through which we perceive the sun, it would have to be said that, 
once illuminated, our sight would necessarily see the sun, which is not the 
case. Concluding, it may be said that for Suárez lumen is a natural (physical) 
quality inhering in a translucent subject. It does not radiate in the manner 
of material effluence of corpuscles by means of local motion, but only by 
means of (instantaneous) qualitative change in this subject. 
2. Colour as a Real Quality
Suárez’s discussion of the ontology of colours shows that the issue of the 
ontological status of colours, so typical for both early modern discussion 
in general and the contemporary discussion in analytical philosophy,9 was 
“a hot issue” for the Jesuit as well. At the same time it displays that the status 
9 For the early modern and the contemporary discussion among physicalism (the qualita-
tive aspect of colour of which we are conscious is a physical quality of sensibles), disposi-
tionalism (the qualitative aspect of colour is a disposition of sensibles to produce certain 
colour experience) and subjectivism (the qualitative aspect of colour is exemplified by 
perceivers) see Ross 2015, 411–9. 
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quaestionis of DA VII, 2, in which the question is ex professo treated, can be 
seen as similar to that formulated by the philosophers of the nominalist lore 
in the late medieval philosophy of the 14th century.10 Suárez’s “Fragestel-
lung” in the second question of DA VII is marked by a reductionist view of 
colours. On this concept colours are nothing but structural properties having 
quantitative characteristics such shape, structure, etc., at the surfaces of 
opaque bodies, which account for the ways in which light is reflected to the 
percipient. On this view, colours are nothing above the light reflected by 
the surface of the opaque body to the percipient. Accordingly, ontologically 
speaking, there is no essential difference between lumen and colours. The 
manner of reflection at the surface of the body correlates with the perception 
of a particular colour.11 Although this position is notoriously taken to be one 
of Descartes’s views of colours – no doubt the less idealistic than his other 
views12 – this account is not, as Anneliese Maier shows (Maier 1963, 3–32), 
without its medieval antecedents. It was Nicole Oresme (c.1320–1382) who 
can be regarded as one of the potential medieval advocates of this opinion. 
Accordingly, colour as such is construed in terms of the dispositional 
properties of the object causing sensation in us (DA VII, 2, 1, vol. 2, 570). 
Albeit Suárez does not abandon the basic position according to which 
colours are grounded in light, he is far from reducing colour to the quanti-
tative (dispositional) properties of the surfaces of visible objects: “Colours 
are real and permanent qualities inherent in coloured bodies, even though 
these bodies are not illuminated” [“colorem secundum substantiam suam 
10 For the issue of the nature of light and colour and their interrelation in late medieval 
nominalism see Lindberg 1976, 133–7.
11 On the modern physical theory, the reflected light can be separated into two components, 
namely into a diffuse component and a specular component. While the light in its first 
component is reflected form the surface at many angels, and thus it displays relatively 
little dependence on the angle between the light source, the object’s surface and the eye, 
the incident ray in its second constituent comes from a single incoming direction and is 
reflected into a single outgoing direction. Unlike the first, the second reflection is more 
mirror-line and highly directional. Accordingly, if we take into account the second compo-
nent, it may be said that the same surface can potentially give rise to different perceptive 
qualities in two different perceivers. For this distinction between these components in the 
reflected light, see Hilbert 2015, 259.
12 For three different theories of colour in Descartes, see Wolf-Devine 1993, 44–49.
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esse qualitatem permanentem in corpore colorato, etiam si non illuminetur, 
resultantem in illo ex mixtione elementorum.” (DA VII, 2, 2, vol. 2, 572). 
The view that Peter ceases to be a white man at sunset sounds incredible to 
Suárez. Colours are not visible in the dark, indeed. In order to be visible they 
need to be illuminated. But their visibility, a property of colours, is something 
different from their ontological status. As the argument from variability and 
invariability shows, they differ from light since the sensation of the white 
colour can remain identical while light changes. The gradual lack of light 
at sunset can be compensated by an approximation of the percipient to the 
coloured body. The variation of the former and the invariability of the latter 
point to their ontological difference (DA VII, 2, 3, vol. 2, 574). 
If colour is a permanent quality of objects and provided that it originates 
from a mixture of elements in the body, how does the mixture, i.e., secondary 
quality, look like? In his exposition Suárez notes that beside the primary 
qualities of Cold, Warm, Dry and Moist, which in different proportions con-
stitute the four basic elements, sc. Water, Earth, Fire and Air, the elements 
can also be classified according to the degree of their diaphaneity. While 
Fire represents the lucid factor or a luminary source, Earth represents the 
contrary aspect, i.e., opacity. While Fire is the active source of illumination, 
the element of Earth impedes its action. The other two elements, Water and 
Air, are the factors, which are entirely penetrable by light. The more the 
mixture has of Air or of Water, the more it participates in diaphaneity and 
the more it disgregates sight. Conversely, the more it possesses of Earth, 
the more it tends to be opaque and the more it congregates sight. Since 
each resulting mixture is always composed not only of one element, namely 
of Earth, but also of other elements, it retains, in greater or lesser degree, 
traces of diaphaneity as well. Suárez stresses that the Fire inherent in the 
body, more or less “choked” by the opacity of the Earth in the body, does not 
persist in the mixture formally qua Fire. In fact, it is transformed to a new 
ontological quality, which is colour (DA VII, 2, 3, vol. 2, 574–8). Concluding, 
colour is a secondary (in the scholastic, not early modern, sense) quality 
which is the act of a mixed body inasmuch as it has perspicuity limited 
(damped) by opacity (DA VII, 2, 3, vol. 2, 578–580).
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3. Adequate Object of Vision
In Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy colour as the proper sensible object of 
sight is at large deemed to be the formal or the adequate object of vision.13 
Colour seems to be widely regarded as the total object of sight. Strictly 
speaking, this claim is not the position of Suárez (DA VII, 3, 7, vol. 2, 596). 
It has been stressed that for Suárez sight can see not only colours but also 
light – light constitutes the terminus of sight. [“[…] obiectum adaequatum 
visus esse lumen et omne quod lumine manifestatur, seu res illuminata ut 
sic.”] (DA VII, 3, 7, vol. 2, 596). Following Aristotle,14 Suárez refers to a group 
of visible colourless things such as fire and stars called lucid things (res 
lucidae). The object of sight is not only colour but also the light of res lucida. 
Lumen is not only the medium through which we see, but no less also an 
object of vision (DA VII, 3, 1, vol. 2, 586–8).
Suárez proposes two upshots, which both shed light on the nature of 
the interrelationship between visibles (light qua the object of vision and 
colours) and light conceived as via from the power to the sensible. In the 
first conclusion he affirms that lucid things, as a special category of visible 
objects, do not require as a necessary condition both the prior illumination 
and the presence of light in the medium since they can be seen through their 
own light (DA VII, 3, 2, vol. 2, 588). Lucid things generate twofold activity, 
namely they diffuse lumen and the visual species (DA VII, 3, 2, vol. 2, 590). 
Accordingly, it may seem “logical” that they themselves at first illuminate 
the medium, through which they (can) multiply their visual species and only 
thus the lucid things as such become visible. At variance with this position, 
Suárez asserts that their illumination of the medium is far from necessary 
for their visibility. The eyes of a cat whose light is so weak that it can hardly 
illuminate the whole medium incident between it and the percipient, can be 
seen in the darkest night. Moreover, Suárez admits the possibility that the 
visual species can be diffused further than the real entity of light, which in 
13 For this claim cf., e.g., Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, 1888, I, q. 1, art. 3, co., 12. 
14 Aristotle mentions fungi, flesh, heads, scales or eyes of fishes. See On the Soul, 2000, book 
2, ch. 7, 419a5–7, 107.
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fact can be seen only by virtues of its visual species. As less perfect entities 
(more on this see in Part 5), the visual species of light can attain the more 
remote places than light itself (DA VII, 3, 3, vol. 2, 590).15 
Although actual illumination of the medium is not necessary for colours 
to be colours in actu, in order to be visible they must be illuminated.16 
In the first part of the second conclusion, Suárez claims that contrary to 
the aforesaid lucid things colours must be illuminated per se. Without being 
illuminated they cannot emit their visual species. Even though colours as 
such are visible, they are visible only “remotely”. In order to become visible 
“proximately” they must be lightened beforehand. However, albeit this per 
se illumination of colours themselves is necessary, this does not hold for 
the medium. In the second part of the conclusion, Suárez says that it is not 
necessary for the medium to be illuminated per se, it is enough for it to be 
illuminated only ex consequenti. What does this phrase mean? I take Suárez 
saying that the illumination of the medium is only the consequence of the 
illumination of the visible. If the sensible is lighted, then also its immediate 
surroundings have to be illuminated as well. While the first illustration is 
the necessary condition as far as the first stage of the production of visual 
operation is concerned, the second illumination is not inevitable. Next, 
clearly, if Suárez admits this dispensability of prior light in the medium, all 
the more he has to grant it in the case of illumination of the visual faculty 
itself (DA VII, 3, 4, vol. 2, 590–2). As spectators in the theatre we know well 
that we can perceive actors while being in total darkness. 
4. Visual Species 
It has been said that lucid things as natural agents generate twofold oper-
ation, namely the illumination of the medium and the emission of visual 
15 This further reaching emission of the sensible species holds for the audible and the olfac-
tory species as well. For hearing see DA VII, 8, 7, vol. 2, 670–2; for smell see DA VII, 3–4, 
vol. 2, 702–6. It is also one of the main reasons why to posit the sensible species in the 
external senses.
16 Strictly speaking, visibility can be taken as the property of colours. 
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(impressed) species. It was also conceded by Suárez that the visual species 
can be multiplied to a distance going beyond that of light. The claim about 
the natural efficacy of the species is developed in DA V, 2, where Suárez 
explicitly deals with the issue of the nature of the sensible species, which 
is essential for any explanation of the principles of a perceptual act. [“Unio 
obiecti cognoscibilis cum potentia est necessaria in omni cognitione.”] 
(DA V, 1, 3, vol. 2, 286). Much like in case of light also here before asking 
“Quid sit?” Suárez approaches the issue “An sit?”. 
His argument for the existence of the sensible species, a claim targeted 
against Ockham and his action at a distance,17 is basically twofold. While 
the first one is based on a priori reasoning, the second one is an a posteriori 
argument. On the first way of arguing Suárez starts from the axiom of broadly 
conceived Aristotelian cognitive psychology. On this axiom, cognition 
proceeds by means of assimilation of the cognizant to the thing known. 
The known thing must be, as it were, dragged into the percipient. Clearly, 
a sensible cannot be pulled into a cognizant in its real being but only by 
means of its intentional proxy, i.e., by means of the sensible species, which 
can be either the thing’s real form (without matter), as it is the case in Aris-
totelian-Thomistic philosophy in general, or the (virtual) representation of 
the sensible (Suárez’s own stance). Besides, the external senses in themselves 
are indifferent to cognition of this or that sensible object. In order to revoke 
their neutrality, they must be determined intrinsically. The neutrality of the 
cognitive power must be revoked only via intrinsic determination, namely 
via the visual species (DA V, 1, 5, vol. 2, 290–2). According to one of more 
experientiae, which are to substantiate the existence of the sensible (visual) 
species, it holds that we have to posit the visual species since it is the only 
available explanans of the situation, in which Peter standing in front of 
a mirror sees in the mirror an object located behind him. Peter can see it 
due to the mirror’s reflection of the visual species of the object (DA V, 1, 
4, vol. 2, 288). 
17 For Ockham’s denial of the intentional species see Tachau 1988, 133–4. 
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The aforesaid affinity of the sensible species with lumen leads Suárez to 
two conclusions, which constitute half of the overall quaternion of propo-
sitions on the issue of the nature of sensible species. If lumen in medio is an 
accidental form, namely a quality inhering in the air, the visual species must 
be an accident of quality as well (DA V, 2, 2, vol. 2, 296). Much like lumen is not 
a particle that moves locally from the luminous source to the visible object 
and then is reflected to the percipient, so the sensible species cannot be an 
“Epicurean” eidolon,18 as caricatured by Descartes in his first chapter De la 
lumiere of his La Dioptrique, which “flies” as a material picture in the air from 
the visible object to the eyes.19 Its “transfer” must occur instantaneously. 
In a link to perspectivi, Suárez says that this species is linearly multiplied in 
all directions, i.e., circularly, from all sides of the visible object. Like light 
inhering at first in the luminous source (lux) and then in the translucent 
medium (lumen), so the sensible species at first inheres as an accident in the 
substance and then as an accident in the illuminated medium, from which 
potentiality it is multiplied. Rather than pertaining to the kind of quality 
called figura the visual species belongs to the kind of disposition (DA V, 2, 
23, vol. 2, 324). The essentially accidental character of the sensible species 
of the external senses is confirmed by the ontological dependence of the 
sensible species on the sensible qualities of the material substance. At least 
in the natural order, the sensible species depends on those objects both in 
their fieri and conservari (DA V, 2, 2, vol. 2, 296).20
The physical character of light finds its systematic counterpart in 
Suárez’s second conclusion. Contrary to the intelligible species, the sen-
sible species is fully material and divisible (DA V, 2, 17, vol. 2, 316). It is 
not improper to say that the explicit refusal of the spiritual character of 
18 For the passage, where Epicurus characterizes his eidolon see Miira Tuominen 2014, 44–5. 
19 “… petites images voltigeâtes par l’air, nommées des espèces intentionales, qui travaillent 
tant l’imagination des Philosophes”, René Descartes, La Dioptrique, 1902, Discours 1, 85. 
20 I am leaving aside the issue of the possibility of divine intervention, in which God can 
cause in us the perception of an absent object, i.e., the kind of abstract cognition. If it 
holds that the sensible species is the absolute entity generating efficient causality, it has 
to be, in principle, substitutable by the divine causal intervention. For this see DA VI, 5, 
516–528 and also Heider 2016b, 173–203.
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sensible species can be seen also in the context of Suárez’s indirect critique 
of Aquinas’s notion of visual species. Without delving into Aquinas’s theory 
and the detailed comparison of the conceptions of both authors, which would 
require another study, it must be said that as compared to the Jesuit Aquinas 
is obviously more inclined to “spiritualization” of the sensible species, as he 
seems to be in case of light too.21 If lumen and the proper organ of the visual 
power, namely the pupil, is corporeal, the sensible species must be material 
as well. It does not make much sense to say that a spiritual species is received 
in a material subject. In harmony with its materiality, Suárez also refuses 
the theory, which takes the natural and the intentional (spiritual) sides of 
the sensible species to be really distinct aspects of the sensible species.22 
Although material and divisible, it is not of the same kind as sensible 
objects (DA V, 2, 8, 306). In a critique of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (1275– 
–1332 or 1334),23 Suárez avers that they are specifically (speciei) different. 
Contrary to light, the species cannot be the object of our perception. 
If the visual species were the immediate object of sensation (we would 
get a representationalist theory of perception), it would have to be of the 
21 For the sample of Aquinas’s statements going in this “spiritualizing” direction see the 
following: “Corpus enim naturale recipit formas secundum esse naturale et materiale … 
sed sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et immaterialiter secundum 
esse quoddam intentionale”, Thomas de Aquino, Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato, 1985, 
tr. 1, l. 19, n. 11, 99. Contrary to Suárez, Aquinas lays the emphasis on the theory advo-
cating the spiritualizing effect of light, which he considers to be the probable view: “Alii 
dicunt, quod lux non habet esse firmum et ratum in natura, sed est tantum intentio: sicut 
enim dicitur, quod species coloris per aerem ad pupillam delata, in aere non habet esse 
naturale, sed spirituale […], ita etiam intentio corporis lucidi in relictas est lumen. Et haec 
opinio valde probabilis est […] ut dicit Dionysius: ex hoc etiam est quod [lux; D. H.] colori-
bus esse spirituale confert, secundum quod esse recipiunt in medio et in organo; unde et 
ipsum lumen virtutem spiritualem habet”, Thomas de Aquino, Scriptum super Sententiis, 
lib. 2 d. 13 q. 1 a. 3, co. [accessed August 18, 2016]. Available on-line: http://www.corpus-
thomisticum.org/snp2012.html. As regards the Jesuit reaction in general to this Thomist 
“spiritualizing” tendency, see Wolf-Devine 1993, 31. For Albert the Great’s and Aquinas’s 
immaterial interpretation of the spiritual being of visual species cf. also Knuuttila 2008, 
13–4. 
22 For Suárez’s presentation of this view see DA V, 2, 5–6, vol. 2, 302–6; for the sharp critique 
of this position cf. DA V, 5, 24, vol. 2, 326. 
23 I cannot entirely share Jörg Telkamp’s view that “… Durandus is Suárez’s main source, 
with whom he disagrees only occasionally”. Cf. Jörg Alejandro Telkamp, 2012, 7.
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same kind with the visible object. In his vindication of direct realism Suárez 
underlines that the species is (at least, non–reflexively) “ignota” (DA V, 2, 
6, vol. 2, 306). So what we see in the mirror is not the visual species. Nor 
can it be said that what we actually see in the mirror is the mirror plus the 
reflected thing in the way that through the single visual species we get the 
likeness of diverse objects, namely the mirror and the mirrored thing. In his 
anti-representationalism, Suárez asserts that through the species we see in 
the mirror an external object itself (DA V, 2, 16, vol. 2, 316). 
In his last conclusion, Suárez comes to assert that the materiality of 
sensible species does not mean that the species is not the formal likeness 
of sensibles (DA V, 2, 21, vol. 2, 322). Sensible species does not pertain to 
a higher and nobler ontological place in the hierarchy of being than its 
“parental” object. In order to be produced it does not need an “ontological 
elevator” such as a separated intelligence or God who would transform the 
sensible quality to intention which could be received by sight (DA VI, 2, 3, 
vol. 2, 470–2). This transformation is not made by the illuminated medium 
either. It comes to exist only by virtue of the sensible quality itself. The 
visual species is the trace (vestigium) or imperfect participation of sensible 
quality. It does not require a higher cause concurring in the production of 
the intention in the medium and in the organ. The heat produced in my hand 
by fire is of higher perfection than its species (DA VI, 2, 6, vol. 2, 474–6). 
5. “Direction” of Vision and Spatial Perception
Even though Suárez considers the reception of the visual species to be the 
necessary first stage in the origin of a visual act, there is still the query, 
typical for visual theory since the days of Plato, whether the act of vision 
proceeds only by so-called intromission (reception) of the sensible species, 
or also by so-called extramission of the visual (animal) spirits or rays. 
According to Plato, Galen,24 and others vision does not run by the mere 
24 Timaeus, 1925, 45b–d; as regards Galen, see Siegel 1970, 46–7. The fact is in Theaetetus 
Plato does not deny that the visual species come from the object to sight (see Theaetetus, 
1921, 156e). 
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reception of something from the outside but rather by the emission of the 
visual rays from the eyes (being of fiery disposition rather than of watery 
temperament) toward the visible object.25 
In his typology of various versions of the extramission doctrine Suárez 
moves very systematically.26 There are two main versions (each having two 
subvariants) of this doctrine. While one can be called the non-reflexive 
version, the other can be termed the reflexive variety. On the first sub-
-version of the first kind the visual spirits, due to the pneumatic tension 
in the eyes, emanate from the eyes and by altering the medium they attain 
the visible object itself, in which the spirits intermingle with the visual 
species emitted from the sensible object. Without coming back to the eyes 
they constitute the vision itself in the presence of the visual object. On the 
second subvariant, espoused by the Spanish physician Francisco Vallés 
(1524–1592),27 the visible object at first emits the visual species up to the 
eyes, where the visual spirits get mixed with them. When the visual spirits 
connect with daylight, the air, due to this alteration, acquires the capability 
to see. Much like an extrapolated optical nerve the point in the air becomes 
a sort of prosthesis of the eyes. Accordingly, the air becomes “sentiens” and 
the human acquires sort of a second visual organ in the air.28 On the second 
main version, there are again two alternatives. When the eyes emit the light 
or the visual spirits to the visible object, they blend with the visual species of 
the object and return to the eyes to produce the act of vision there. On the 
second sub-version of this reflexive approach, the visual spirits do not attain 
up to the visible object but mingle with the visual species somewhere in the 
25 For an excellent exposition of this account in Plato and his forerunners, see Lindberg 
1976, 3–6.
26 For the illustrative scheme of these versions see Castellote 1962, 147.
27 For Vallés, the important reference for Suárez, see Castellote 1963. 
28 “Multiplicari a coloribus species eiusdem naturae cum illis usque ad pupillam oculi, 
& rursus exire animales spiritus usque ad externam superficiem pupillae, & illinc lumen 
quoddam coeleste, eiusdem generis cum lumine solis, quod solum per se non potest il-
lustrare aerem, cum externo lumine coire … Iuxta quam sententiam recipit aer influxum 
virtutis videndi illustratione illa, non aliter quam nervus, & ita est nobis aer pro medio 
coniuncto, in quo videmus. Visio itaque unica agitur in aere & oculo. Haec enim duo me-
dia unum fiunt. Unde constat quodammodo, aerem esse sentientem, quia videmus per 
aerem”, Valles 1556, lib. 2, cap. 28, 106–7.
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medium. Only from that point in the medium they come back to the eyes, 
where vision gets located (DA VII, 4, 1, vol. 2, 600–4). 
In direct link to Aristotle,29 Suárez reproves all the versions of extra-
mission in favour of the intromissionary account. At least in its first stage, 
vision proceeds only by means of reception of the visual species (DA VII, 4, 
2, vol. 2, 604). Four arguments are presented on behalf of this conclusion. 
First, the visual rays are redundant. The impressed species emitted from 
the sensible objects through the air and received in the attentive cognitive 
power is all we need for the elicitation of vision. No emission of visual rays 
or spirits proceeding from the eyes outside is necessary (DA VII, 4, 2, vol. 
2, 604). Second, what actually are these visual spirits? They can be neither 
substances nor accidents. If they were substances, they would have to be 
either generated de novo in the air, or they would come to be through the 
local movement from the eyes. The first alternative is impossible since every 
substantial generation entails the corruption of the preceding substance, 
which in this case would be the air. This corruption is at odds with our 
experience, though. The second option is even less plausible. If the visual 
rays were “flying” in the air, vision would have duration, which runs afoul 
with the instantaneous character of vision. Moreover, during sunny days the 
more tenuous visual rays would have to be eliminated by the more intense 
light (DA VII, 4, 2, vol. 2, 604-6). Third, the non-reflexive version of the 
extramission theory is at variance with the essentially vital and immanent 
character of sensation. It is absurd to say that the air as a soulless entity 
could see (DA VII, 4, 3, vol. 2, 608). Fourth, it does not make sense to say 
that the visual rays come only to a certain point in the medium from which 
they return to the eye. If there is no impediment in the medium, no such 
a reflection in this point is possible. The emission of visual spirits from the 
eye is not a free action (DA VII, 4, 4, vol. 2, 610). 
Despite the number of arguments against the theory of extramission, as 
Suárez shows, Vallés argues for the theory of extramission on the different 
29 For Aristotle’s criticism of the theory of extramission see De sensu et sensato, cap. 2, 
437b13 5: “[…] if vision occurred when light issues from the eye as from a lantern, why 
should not vision be equally possible in the dark?”. 
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basis, namely by referring to what can be regarded as the blind spot of the 
Aristotelian tradition in general. It is the perception of size and distance 
of visible objects, which are commonly rated to be the common sensibles.30 
Although Aristotelians usually mentions explicitly only five of the common 
sensibles, besides size it is figure, number, quiet, and movement, Suárez 
adduces also distance, and says that it is reducible to size. As he says, distance 
is the size actually or potentially inserted between two things (DA VI, 1, 
9, vol. 2, 462). But how can there be an intention of such relational thing 
as distance in the visual species? On Vallés, Aristotelians actually cannot 
explain this issue. As ridiculous he rejects the view that there is a special 
visual species of distance. No less he denies the claim that distance is per-
ceived by means of the same species as colour but by some modification of 
the species of the proper sensible. He makes clear that neither the perfect 
nor the attenuated species can cause the vision of proximity or distance. 
These species can cause at most more or less perfect seeing of colour. He 
concludes that size and distance can only be seen if the faculty “steps out” 
through the air to the visible thing itself. Only when meeting the visible 
object can the faculty “measure” the distance and size of the object.31 
In his reply to Vallés the Jesuit agrees that the size of the sensible object 
is seen neither through the size of the visible species – the small species 
represents a high mountain – nor by virtue of a special species. Neverthe-
less, with reference to DA VI, 1, Suárez explains that size and distance are 
represented as modifications of the visual (proper) species. Despite this 
conclusion, which is part of the Aristotelian tradition, Suárez considers the 
issue of spatial perception to be “a hot issue”. However, it is not controversial 
30 On different models of spatial perception including the modern ones of Descartes and 
Berkeley see Yrjönsuuri, 2014, 187–206. The doctrinal swing to the theories of extramis-
sion motivated by the issue of spatial perception can be seen also in contemporary discus-
sion. For extramissionist theories and spatial perception see Hilbert 2015, 259–260. 
31 Vallés 1556, lib. 2, cap. 28, 106: “... (si nihil de oculis prodiit ad rem videndam) non aliter 
potest videri [proximity; D.H.], quam aut specie alia, aut illius eiusdem speciei modo alio. 
Sed horum alterum est ridiculum: alterum falsum … intensior species intensum videri 
faciet colorem, non propinquum: remissior remissiorem, non distantiorem”; ibid. 107: 
“Visio itaque fit intrantibus speciebus, quo colores sentiantur, & afficiantur proprium 
visus instrumentum: & facultate exeunte ad dimetiendum distantiam & magnitudinem”.
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only for Aristotelians but also for Galenists. Considering Valles’s version 
of the theory of extramission Suárez notes that with respect to the query 
of how we perceive distance this theory has the following demerit: how to 
explain the perception of the distance, which remains between the point in 
the air where the vision is terminated and the visible object itself? If Vallés 
denies the theory embraced by Suárez, namely that the distance and size 
of the visible object is perceived by means of a modification of the visual 
species, it is Vallés, not Suárez, who has to carry the onus probandi in the 
explanation of the issue how to understand the spatial perception (DA VII, 
4, 7, vol. 2, 614–6). 
If the only plausible explanans of the perception of size and distance is 
by modification of the visual species of the proper sensible, how does Suárez 
precisely understand it? Within his intromissionary account Suárez at first 
offers a traditional account of why things appear to us bigger or smaller. 
According to the common view of perspectivi and Aquinas,32 the reason why 
objects appear to us to be bigger or smaller is the size of the angle formed 
by the visual species sent forth from the visible objects. According to this 
theory, which is called the doctrine of visual cone (pyramid), visual species 
are emitted from the visible objects in the form of a pyramid, the base of 
which is the visible object and its vertex is the eye. The longer are the lateral 
sides of this cone, the lesser angle we get. Provided that this reduction of 
the visual angle obtains in case of the same object, it is clear that this object 
appears to be smaller and becomes more distant than before. It is also 
identity in the size of the angle at the vertex of the cone what explains why 
we perceive objects of different size as identical (DA VII, 4, 8, vol. 2, 616). 
32 Thomas de Aquino, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2 l. 15 nn. 8–9, 133–4: “… omne corpus vide-
tur sub quodam angulo cuiusdam trianguli vel magis pyramidis, cuius basis est in re visa 
et angulus est in oculo videntis … cum res visa sit maior quantitate, quam pupilla, oportet 
quod proportionaliter diminuendo pervenit immutatio visibilis, usque ad visum; mani-
festum est autem, quod quanto latera trianguli vel pyramidis sunt longiora, dummodo 
sit eadem basis, tanto angulus est minor, et ideo quod a remotiori videtur, minus vide-
tur, et tanta potest esse distantia quod omnino non videtur”. Clearly, this mathematical 
approach has its roots in Euclidean geometry. For the ancient roots of optical geometry 
see Lindberg 1976, 11–7. 
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Despite the common plausibility of this view Suárez does not share it 
entirely. He is sure that at a certain distance the variation of the visual angle 
does not have any impact on the perception of size. At least within a certain 
medial distance the visible object is seen as identical in size regardless of any 
shift in its angle. Moreover, if we adhered to the theory of the visual cone we 
would have to say that doubling the distance of an object necessarily entails 
reduction of its size to half. However, this reciprocal proportion does not 
cohere with our experience. Furthermore, on the aforesaid theory, things 
perceived under the same angle will always appear to be of the same size. 
Consequently, a small thing standing in the proximity of the percipient and 
a large remote thing will appear to be of the same size since both will result 
in the description of the same angel in the percipient. However, this seems 
to make sensory perception an overly fallible instrument (DA VII, 4, 9, vol. 2, 
618). Contrary to Vallés, Suárez thus recurs to the theory, which he considers 
to be the only one at hand. Within a certain distance the visible object is 
capable of producing a perfect likeness of itself. Thus it is apt to represent 
perfectly the size of the object of which it is the visual species. However, 
beyond a certain distance the formal likeness, emitted by the object, fades 
out and sight can elicit only an imperfect perceptual act. It is only because 
of the reception of this imperfect visual species that the visible object will 
always appear to be smaller. Mutatis mutandis, distance is perceived in the 
same way as well. It is not difficult to cognize the distance of an object 
perfectly imprinting its species in the visual power. If the likeness of the 
object and its impression is less perfect, which is often caused also by the 
quality of the medium (vision at sunset, e.g.), the object is cognized as more 
remote (DA VII, 4, 11, vol. 2, 620).
6. The Organ of Vision and “Double Vision”
While in DA VII, 4 the medical tradition, represented by the names of Galen 
and Vallés, constituted largely the negative point of reference, in DA VII, 
5 where the Jesuit approaches the subject of the anatomy of the eye this 
tradition is for him of crucial authority. Not Aristotle but Andreas Vesalius 
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(1514–1564), the Dutch anatomist and physician, is to be followed in the 
matters of assignation of the proper organ of visual faculty. It was not 
Aristotle’s fault that his views of the visual organ and its root are outdated. 
It is the demerit of the time in which he lived (DA VII, 5, 2, vol. 2, 624). One 
of Suárez’s main corrections of Aristotle’s statements consists in his refusal 
to locate the principle of sensation in the heart. The “root” of sentiendi lies in 
the brain (DA VI, 6, 6, vol. 2, 534). However, even though the title of DA VII, 
5 – “Quodnam sit et quale organum potentiae visivae et potentia ipsa” – is 
formulated in physiological terms, the framework of the query is articulated 
in the psychological way, namely why is there, phenomenologically speaking, 
only one seeing, and not two, if the eyes are two.33 
The Jesuit indicates that answering this question requires a brief account 
of the anatomy of the human eye, which he takes from the second book of 
Vesalius’s De fabrica corporis humani (1543). The substance of the eye having 
an oval shape contains five tunics, three humours and seven muscles. Passing 
over the names of the muscles Suárez provides the reader with the names 
of the humours and tunics. In the centre of the oval substance there is the 
pupil consisting of the colourless crystalline (glacial) humour. This trans-
parent liquid is served by two surrounding humours, namely by the vitreous 
and by the albuminoid humour. At the same time it is also assisted by five 
tunics: the innermost tunic is the arachnoid membrane, there follows the 
recticular membrane, the uvea tunic, the cornea and the outer conjunctive 
layer (DA VII, 5, 1, vol. 2, 620–4). Further, there are two optic nerves, one is 
right, the other is left. While the left originates in the left part (hemisphere) 
of the brain, the right descends from the right part. Both optic nerves are 
channels through which the animal spirits go from the brain and assist in 
the production of vision – this also why the brain injury affects the external 
sensation proper. Both nerves intersect and create what anatomists call the 
optic chiasma (DA VII, 5, 7, vol. 2, 630). As Suárez shows, for some medieval 
authors – Avicenna and Albert the Great – the proper organ of vision or the 
33 Descartes and also contemporary authors were well aware of this problem. For Descartes 
see Wolf-Devine 1993, 59; as regards the stereoscopic vision in contemporary debate see 
Hilbert 2015, 263–4.
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final sensorium was precisely this chiasma. According to them we can have 
unique vision only because of this intersection. If the pupil, and not this 
intersection, were the organ of vision, we could not have one but only two 
visions (DA VII, 5, 8, vol. 2, 630). 
Suárez does not sympathize with this view. Following Galen he de-
clares that the pupil is the proper organ of the visual power. He brings in 
two arguments. One is based on the substance of the crystalline humour. 
The adequate organ of the visual power must be the crystalline humour since 
precisely this matter, and not any other coloured stuff, is most suitable for 
the reception of the visual species. The glacial humour is soft, diaphaneous 
and colourless. If it were, say, black, it could not receive the white colour. 
The black colour would prevent it from the reception of the white colour 
much like bitter coating on the tongue affects our tasting of honey. As such 
the glacial humour is ideal for the reception of colours because the perceiving 
power must be deprived of the nature of its object.34 The second argument 
comes from medical experience. If the pupil is irrecoverably injured, vision 
is irrecoverably impaired as well. This does not always obtain if the other 
humours and tunics are impaired (DA VII, 5, 3, vol. 2, 626). 
However, if the optic chiasma is not the proper organ of vision, for what 
is it instituted by nature? On Suárez the intersection of the optic nerves is 
ordained by nature not for getting unique vision but for a different reason, 
namely for a certain compensation. In case one eye is impaired and a man 
becomes single-eyed, the optic chiasma will insure that the animal spirits 
flowing from the brain normally to both eyes will get in the higher degree 
to the second (healthy) eye, by which the power of the healthy eye will be 
strengthened in its vision. Moreover, it is not true that if the proper organ 
is the pupil we must get two visions. If our eyes have the same position 
(situs) – and one does not have the concave shape while the other has the 
convex one –, which they normally do, they will be equally affected by the 
visual species. Only in the rare and abnormal cases when there happens to 
34 Aristotle, On the Soul, 2000, 418b26–7, 165: “It is the colourless which is receptive of co-
lour, as the soundless is of sound.” 
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be an inequality in the positions of the eyes, a single thing will appear to 
be double (DA VII, 5, 9, vol. 2, 632).
Conclusion
An important formal feature of Suárez’s visual theory and, in fact, of his 
whole Commentary on De anima in general is the Jesuit’s exceedingly read-
er-friendly manner of the presentation. Even though Suárez clearly follows 
the model of the Stagirite’s On the Soul, above all his book 2, ch. 7, and his 
visual theory can be evaluated as Aristotle-oriented, his exposition amounts 
to first of all a radical systematization of the Stagirite text. Compared with 
the almost contemporary Coimbran Commentary on De anima, the textual 
segment of DA VII, 1–5 is a clear systematical enterprise following ordo 
doctrinae and not model of Aristotle’s text. Nowhere in the pertinent parts 
of the DA VII Suárez’s disquisition goes astray in the redundant detail. 
Everywhere it is obvious where he “stands”, which position is advocated by 
him, and what are his opponents’s views. Throughout the text Suárez keeps 
as distinct the systematical and the exegetical level of his exposition. In 
a word, the pertinent textual segment, where his theory of visual perception 
is articulated, manifests that it was prepared by the author as the study 
support for his students while he was teaching Curso de artes at the Jesuit 
College in Segovia in the first half of the 1570s.
Even though Suárez’s visual theory largely draws on Aquinas’s com-
mentaries on Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Sense and Sensible Objects, the 
Jesuit’s understanding of light and visual species, as could have been seen 
from the occasional comparisons with Aquinas, can hardly be considered 
to be identical with the Angelic doctor’s statements. The Jesuit’s recurrent 
claims that the visual species does not receive the (literal) spiritual being in 
the illuminated translucent medium is anything but the statement, which 
would be authorized by Aquinas. Suárez’s unambiguous emphasis on the 
physical character of light, which is like colour visible by means of its own 
species, is also the claim that is difficult to detect in the emphatic way in 
Aquinas. No doubt, Suárez’s explicit addition of lumen to the ambit of the 
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total formal object of vision can be seen as the doctrinal consequence of 
his “naturalistic” concept of light. If any tradition is to be named, with 
which this aspect of Suárez’s visual theory could be linked, it seems to 
me that it is the tradition of perspectivism.35 However, it is not only the 
Aristotelian heritage and the perspectivist tradition, which determined 
Suárez’s approach. As shown especially in the sections devoted to the intro/
extramissionary account of vision and to the issue of the visual organ, 
Suárez was very well acquainted with the Galenist tradition as well. As he 
noted, in anatomical matters the Aristotelian tradition is to be replaced by 
the up-to-date medical tradition, which was in his exposé represented by 
the names of Andreas Vesalius and Francisco Vallés. 
Last but not least, it must be underlined that Suárez’s visual theory 
can be fully appreciated only within the historical context, which is given 
by the broad Aristotelian and the renaissance medical tradition. Suárez’s 
“anti–Cartesianism” is evident in his ontology of (true) colours,36 which are 
conceived as permanent qualities inherent in coloured bodies independently 
of reflection of light. This stand is also palpable in Suárez’s swing to the old 
physics of elements and the primary and secondary (extramental) qualities. 
All this points to the scientific ethos that is different from that of Descartes 
and of other exponents of the scientific revolution in the 17th century. Even 
though from a certain point of view Suárez’s emphasis on the material 
character of the sensible species might have made Descartes’s critique of the 
sensible species easier, it has to be kept in mind that Suárez conceives visual 
species as disposition and not as figures, which were rightfully caricatured 
and censured by Descartes in his La dioptrique. 
35 For Roger Bacon (1214–1294), the foremost representative of this tradition, the sensi-
ble species has only corporeal existence insofar as it requires a material medium within 
which it subsists. For him the species is also less perfect than the natural corporeal agent. 
For the corporeality of species in Bacon see Lindberg 1998, lxvi–lxvii. The fact is Suárez 
does not explicitly refer to Roger Bacon, though. Mostly he refers to perspectivi in general, 
only sporadically he cites explicitly from Alhazen or Witelo. Clearly, this statement would 
require a much more in-depth analytical comparison with the abovementioned authors. 
36 Suárez admits also the apparent colours, in which perception light is a decisive factor. For 
the distinction between the true and the apparent (rapidly changing) colours see DA VII, 
8, vol. 2, 582–6.
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